## Appendix A.

Facts	Citation	Claim
The plan is also heavily infected	Para. 2	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
with an intent to discriminate,		
on the basis of race and		
ethnicity The drastic changes		
made by the Texas Legislature		
removed tens of thousands of		
voters from this optimum-sized		
district, then added tens of		
thousands of new voters to the		
district. These actions were		
taken in order to ensure that		
white voters would be able to		
control a majority of the		
voting districts in the area.		
Of the 10 Congressional	Para. 3	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
Districts in the Houston area,		
white voters were drawn to		
control 7 of them, even though		
whites are only 33.6 percent of		
the area population.		
Instead of being drawn a new	Para. 3	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
Congressional District that they		
could control, Latino voters		
were packed into existing		
African-American and Latino		
opportunity districts, or		
cracked into white- or Anglo-		
dominated districts.		
Latinos and African-	Para. 3	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
Americans were sliced and		
diced to make the map of the		
region achieve its		
discriminatory purpose and		
objective.		

Congressional District 9,	Para. 3	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
though in need of essentially no	Tara. 3	VICE, 17 , 13 .
surgery, received 12 new		
precincts from Fort Bend		
County;		
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13 new precincts from Brazoria		
County; 10 new precincts from		
the 18th Congressional District		
in Harris County; and lost 11		
precincts in Fort Bend County.		
Precincts in the Hobby Airport area were removed from		
area were removed from Congressional District 29 and		
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moved into Congressional District 9. As a result, the		
already optimal-sized district		
became a completely new		
district.		
Performance figures show that		
the African-American voter		
percentages and the related		
performance of the 18th		
decreased. Thus, it		
retrogressed in terms of		
effectiveness.		
	Para. 4	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
The 30th Congressional district lost voters to the 6th	raia. 4	VKA, 14, 15.
Congressional District. The		
minority voters who were lost		
from that district were placed		
into the 6th in order to provide		
population to the 6th		
Congressional District under		
circumstances where the <b>voters</b>		
who were cracked out of the		
30th would have no ability to		
elect the candidate of their		
choice.		

Further, the 30th was reduced from an above 50 percent Black Citizen Voting Age Majority District to a below 50 percent Black Citizen Voting Age Majority District.	Para. 4	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
Besides being drawn to ensure that white voters would continue and dominate the majority of area districts in the Harris and Fort Bend Area as well as the Dallas Fort Worth Metroplex Area, the districts were designed to prevent the creation of either a new Latino opportunity district or a new Minority Coalition District with a plurality of Latino population from being drawn in either area.	Para. 4	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
In the 6th Congressional District, a naturally occurring minority district was taking shape and growing. To stymie that rise in minority voters, the map drawers cut out voters from the 6th and placed them in the 30th Congressional District, thereby requiring displacement of existing voters in the nearly optimum sized district.	Para. 5	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
Furthermore, absent corrective action from this Court, this new redistricting plan will continue to dilute the voting strength of Texas' African American and Latino citizens and deny them	Para. 6	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .

fair representation in the United States Congress.		
The individual Congresspersons are all elected with substantial support from the African-American and	Para. 17	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
Latino voters in the districts		
which they represent.  Proportionally, voters of color in Texas are underrepresented in the U.S. House of Representatives in the new map, with white voters being able to control at least 24 of the 38 seats, but more than likely, at least 26 seats. The drafting scheme involved: (a) packing minority voters into districts that were already minority opportunity districts, and therefore, needed no additional minority voters; (b) moving minority voters into districts where they would be outvoted by white voters; and (c) a new third feature that involves placing minority voters in districts where they would be outvoted by progressive white voters.	Para. 20.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
The Senate, thereafter, adopted a map that was even more retrogressive as to the 9th and 18th than is the current proposed map.	Para. 21.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .

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In the hastily called House Committee hearing on redistricting, surprisingly called 48 hours before the scheduled hearing by Chairman Hunter who may have been responding to pressure from anti-minority forces, and called on the same day the hearing on the State House Map was to take place without reasonable notice to members of the Black Caucus and even members of the House Redistricting Committee.	Para. 22.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
As were many of the members of the Legislative Black Caucus, Congresspersons Jackson-Lee and Green were surprised by the short notice of a hearing which came on the morning the House was scheduled to debate the new proposed State House Map.	Para. 22.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
The African-American Vice-Chair of the Redistricting Committee was also unaware that the hearing notice was to be sent out.	Para. 22.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
A full remedy as provided for in C2131 or other maps available to the Legislature was not supported by the Texas Legislative Leadership and this was necessary for it to be favorably considered. Support for such a full remedy would impair or defeat the chances of securing the desired white voter domination in the area.	Para. 23.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .

Congressional District 30 was	Para. 25.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
unnecessarily reduced below a		
Citizen Voting Age population		
of 50 percent and voters were		
cracked out of the district to be		
placed in areas where their votes		
will essentially not count.		
Voters from the 6th		
Congressional district were		
added to the 30th		
Congressional District to		
prevent a naturally occurring		
minority coalition district and		
ensure continued dominance of		
white voters in the 6th.		
Movement of these voters		
required displacement of other		
voters already with		
Congressional District 30, so a		
number of African-American		
voters were cracked out of the		
district to make way for the new		
voters.		
Congressional District 30 was		
near the optimal size so such		
surgery was unnecessary.		
Intervenor Crockett introduced		
an amendment to the		
retrogression, vote dilution or		
racial gerrymander but was not		
successful in achieving passage.		

The population increases in	Para. 25.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
both the Harris County and		
Fort Bend Area as well as the		
Dallas Fort Worth Metroplex		
Area each justified the creation		
of new Congressional minority		
opportunity districts in each		
region. The 2021 plan did not		
create any additional minority		
opportunity or other		
Congressional districts in the		
Dallas Fort Worth Metroplex		
region, but it did create a new		
seat in the Harris County/Ford		
Bend County area. The new		
Harris County/For Bend seat		
will be dominated by white		
voters. A seat could have been		
drawn in this area that was		
either majority Hispanic CVAP		
or majority BHCVAP.		
Congressional Districts 9, 18	Para. 26.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
and 30 were drawn in a way that		
causes retrogression of the		
minority voter strength and		
further undermines the ability		
of African-Americans and		
Latinos to effectively		
participate in the political		
process in those areas, elect the		
candidates of their choice, and		
intentionally discriminates		
against voters in those districts.		
Communities of interest or	Para. 26.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
neighborhoods were cracked or		
split and minorities were placed		
in districts for the purposes of		
enhancing white voter power.		

In the Houston area, there was	Para. 26.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
an area racial gerrymander	1 414. 20.	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
where black voters were moved		
between different		
Congressional Districts so that		
white voters would dominate		
and to avoid creating naturally		
occurring districts that would		
empower minority voters or		
districts that are required under		
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§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act.	Para. 27.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
Black and Brown voters who	1 a1 a. 21.	VICA, 14 , 13 .
represented political problems		
in Congressional Districts such		
as 14, 22 and 36 were moved		
from those districts so that		
white voters would dominate.	D 20	TVD A 14th 15th
Congressional Districts 18 and	Para. 28.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
30 are retrogressed in the		
adopted plan and they are		
retrogressed so that area vote		
dilution and/or a racial		
gerrymander of each area likely		
would take place. Both took on		
unnecessary new voters.		
Congressional Districts 9, 18		
and 30 are all minority		
opportunity districts. The new		
plan reduced the Black Citizen		
Voting Age population of the		
30th from 51 percent to 48		
percent, and the Texas		
Legislature declined to adopt an		
amendment that would have		
cured this retrogression.		

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African-American voters were		
moved from Congressional		
District to Congressional		
District to ensure white voter		
dominance in the Metroplex.		
Black and Brown voters were		
moved from the 6th to the 30th		
and from the 30th to the 32nd		
and from the 5th and 24th to		
the 32nd in order to		
accommodate this scheme.		
Congressional District 24 had		
become a majority non-white		
district but minority residents		
and voters were purged from		
the district so that it is now		
safely a predominately white		
district.		
Black and Brown voters and	Para. 30.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
voters who voted with them		
were moved into Congressional		
District 7 to strengthen that		
district on behalf of the white		
incumbent. This major transfer		
of voters then required the map		
drawers to crack out 10		
precincts from allied		
communities of interest that		
had worked together in the 18th		
Congressional District and		
place them in the 9th.		

The Levisletone Cited to James	Para. 31.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
The Legislature failed to draw	Fala. 31.	VKA, 14, 13.
minority coalition districts		
between Black and Brown		
voters, who vote cohesively in		
areas where they are likely to		
constitute a majority of the		
citizen voting age population,		
but where white voters have		
voted as a block statewide (such		
as in the Dallas/Fort Worth		
Metroplex and in the		
Harris/Fort Bend County		
Area). That is another way of		
denying Black and Brown		
voters an election in which they		
decide the candidates they		
prefer and choose.		
When they do get to choose,		
Black and Brown voters have		
voted cohesively in recent		
national, state and presidential		
elections, among others. Black		
and Brown voters have voted		
cohesively in the recent United		
States Senate race in 2018, the		
Lieutenant Governor's race in		
2018 and the Presidential		
campaigns in 2016 and 2020,		
among many others.		
The 2021 Congressional plans	Para. 33.	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
unnecessarily split communities		
of interest from the 9th, 18th,		
and 30th Congressional		
Districts; removed important		
economic engines from the 9th		
and 18th; packed Latino voters		
unnecessarily into the 18th and		
9th Congressional Districts,		
and were purposefully		
designed to undermine or		
frustrate effective and long-		

term voter coalitions in the	
area as well as effective minority voter participation.	

: The moderal to manuals	VRA, 14 <sup>th</sup> , 15 <sup>th</sup> .
i. The refusal to permit	VKA, 14°, 13°.
participation by the	
Chairperson of the Legislative	
Black Caucus, Nicole Collier, in	
Election Committee Hearings;	
ii. the refusal of the Senate to	
put an African-American	
lawmaker on any election or	
redistricting conference	
committee;	
iii. the refusal of the Senate to	
put a Latino lawmaker on the	
Congressional redistricting bill	
conference committee;	
iv. the refusal of the Senate to	
hear virtual testimony on the	
redistricting bill even though	
the minority community in	
Texas was hugely impacted by	
the coronavirus pandemic;	
v. instead of drafting its own	
Congressional map, the House	
decided to use the Senate	
adopted map as a base map for	
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its work, even though House	
leadership was aware of the	
discrimination that existed in	
the Senate plan;	
vi. instituting a rule that	
required before you could	
present an amendment to the	
proposed map for consideration	
in the Senate Committee, you	
must receive the consent of all	
Congresspersons who would be	
impacted;	
vii. the refusal to receive any	
map for consideration in the	
Senate Redistricting	
Committee unless it was	
plugged into the proposed	

statewide map drawn by the white Congresspersons; viii. the refusal for transparency and appropriate notification. For example, on the day that the House Redistricting Map for Texas House the Representatives was to be considered, the Chairman of House the Redistricting Committee made a surprise announcement that the House would have a hearing on a Congressional Plan in 48 hours and that the Senate Map would provide the base map for this ix. the implementation of gatekeeping rules to prevent Black and Brown lawmakers from amending discriminatory or racial gerrymandering tactics, One example is that lawyers were brought in for the House debate on the Congressional bill, so that any amendments could no longer simply be authorized by the Redistricting Chair or the Speaker. This group of lawyers for the conservative white leadership were required to approve potential amendments before were accepted consideration on the floor; and x. During the House debate on Congressional Intervenor Applicant Crockett and others were required to deliver proposed Amendments to designated Representatives

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who would take them to a room	
in which they could not enter	
for the proposed Amendment	
to be reviewed by white lawyers	
before it could be offered.	
before it could be offered.	